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1. Introduction
Equilibrium job search models have long been used to study labour markets with informational
frictions or search frictions. These frictions create market power for employers and may allow
them to set wages below the marginal productivity of labour. From a policy perspective,
frictions are of key importance, as the consequences of certain economic policies, notably a
mandatory minimum wage, may differ substantially from those in the neoclassical competitive
case; see e.g. Manning (2003).
In this paper, we structurally estimate an equilibrium job search model for the German
labour market to assess minimum wage effects. Before the introduction of a statutory uniform
minimum wage of 8.50 euros per hour in 2015,1 minimum wages had been implemented only
at the sectoral level in a small number of industrial sectors. We estimate the wage-posting
model by Bontemps et al. (1999), extended along the lines of Shephard (2017) to allow
for different job offer arrival rates for the employed and the unemployed. The model is
well-suited for our purposes. As acknowledged in the literature, accounting for heterogeneity
in both firms’ productivity and unemployed workers’ reservation wages does not restrict the
sign of unemployment effects of minimum wages a priori.2
The shapes of the heterogeneity distributions are important determinants of the magnitude
of minimum wage effects. However, data from a market with a minimum wage are not
very informative on the shapes of the left-hand tails of these distributions, as the minimum
wage effectively left-truncates wage outcomes (see e.g. Bontemps et al., 1999). To study
counterfactual minimum wage effects, it is useful to have data from periods without minimum
wages, as the latter data enable identification of the heterogeneity distributions across agents
on larger parts of their support. In particular, in the German context, data from before 2015
allow for identification of the effects of minimum wages below the minimum wage that was
imposed in 2015, whereas data from after 2015 do not allow for that. In the paper we return
to the policy change in 2015 at various instances.
Our empirical analysis relies on a large administrative data set, the IAB Sample of
Integrated Employment Biographies (SIAB). This is a two per cent random sample of
individuals subject to social security contributions during the time period 1975 to 2010. We
focus on data from the period 2007–2010. The SIAB data provide an ideal basis for estimating
a structural equilibrium search model for several reasons. First and most importantly, the data
allow us to precisely measure the duration of different labour market states and transitions
between them, notably job-to-job as well as employment-to-unemployment transitions. These
1While a number of transitional measures respected existing collective agreements and those signed in the
meantime, the uniform minimum wage applied to all industries by 2017 at the latest. A further transitory
exemption was given to those industries where industry-specific minimum wages had already been
introduced prior to 2015 via the Posting of Workers Act (Arbeitnehmerentsendegesetz). The bargaining
parties in an industry subject to this legislation may request that the Federal Ministry of Labour declares
its (minimum wage) agreement to be generally binding for the entire industry.
2Engbom and Moser (2017) use a similar wage-posting model, extended for heterogeneity in workers’
ability, to study the role of the minimum wage in the decline of earnings inequality in Brazil. A closely
related literature assumes wage bargaining instead of wage posting; Flinn (2006) provides a path-breaking
application of these models to analyse minimum wage effects; see also Breda et al. (2016).
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transitions are crucial to the identification of the model’s central parameters, such as job
arrival and destruction rates. Second, as the data are based on employers’ notifications to
the social security authorities, they are less prone to measurement error than comparable
information from survey data. Additional advantages over survey data include the larger
sample size and absence of panel attrition. We focus on low- and medium-skilled individuals,
as we use wage-posting models, and for these groups the assumption of wage posting is more
convincing than for high-skilled individuals.
Our study contributes to the empirical literature on minimum wages in Germany. Most
existing studies evaluate pre-2015 industry-specific minimum wages, typically using difference-
in-differences designs with industries without minimum wage as control groups. In what is
probably the first quasi-experimental study for Germany, Ko¨nig and Mo¨ller (2009) analyse
the introduction of a minimum wage in the construction industry. The authors find no
significant employment effects in West Germany and small negative effects in the East. In
2011, the German Federal Ministry of Labour commissioned an evaluation of minimum
wages in several industries. In general, these studies also tend to find limited employment
effects (e.g. Boockmann et al., 2013; Frings, 2013), with the exception of the roofing industry
(Aretz et al., 2013).
The few available ex-post analyses of the uniform minimum wage imposed in 2015 are
provided by Bossler and Gerner (2016), Garloff (2016) and Caliendo et al. (2017). These
studies also rely on a difference-in-differences design and, in general, exploit variation in
the minimum-wage bite at the regional or establishment-level for treatment assignment. A
key challenge of ex-post evaluation studies that aim to evaluate the effects of the statutory
uniform minimum wage in 2015 is to find suitable control groups. Especially with a uniform
minimum wage that applies to all industries and regions, a major concern is that the
Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) underlying the difference-in-difference
approach may be violated. The uniform minimum wage may be expected to indirectly affect
high-productivity firms or workers, who are not directly subject to the minimum wage, via
spillover effects. Several empirical studies document spillover effects of minimum wages for
instance on wages in the upper part of the wage distribution (e.g., Autor et al., 2016 or
Gregory, 2014 for German roofers).
A critical assumption in this literature is the common trend assumption both prior
to and after the policy intervention. Of course, this also affects an extrapolation of our
own estimation results into 2015. In this context, it is important to note that the large
inflow of refugees and other migrants has led to a disproportionately large employment
growth in specific sectors, such as construction, security, education and training as well as
public administration (Weber, 2016). Compared with ex-post approaches, our study design
has the advantages of being informative about the underlying transmission mechanisms
and of being able to assess counterfactual policies and macroeconomic conditions when
evaluating minimum wages. A few existing structural studies for Germany use models
without search frictions but with labour demand functions derived under the assumption of
perfect competition (Ragnitz and Thum, 2008; Bauer et al., 2009; Knabe and Scho¨b, 2009).
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In this framework, the effects of a minimum wage can by construction only be zero (if the
minimum wage is not binding) or negative.
Our own analyses show that unemployment is a non-monotonic function of the minimum
wage level. A minimum wage level that is equivalent in real terms to the one introduced in
2015 raises the aggregate unemployment rate by around 1.4 percentage points, a sizeable
increase of 13% compared to the old steady-state value.3 We show how the minimum
wage affects the wage setting of more productive firms. Moreover, we document large
heterogeneity in firm productivities, search frictions and in reservation wages across labour
markets differentiated by region and type of occupation. As it turns out, differences across
labour market segments in the firm heterogeneity distribution are the main driver of the
large variation in minimum wage effects across segments.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 starts by giving a brief
overview of the model. Section 3 provides a description of the data set and the construction
of our main variables of interest, and Section 4 presents descriptive statistics. Section 5
outlines the estimation procedure. Section 6 presents the estimation results and graphical
representations of the key steady-state relationships. Section 7 shows simulation results for
the counterfactual introduction of different minimum wage levels. Section 8 concludes.
2. Theoretical Model
2.1. Literature Overview
Equilibrium job search models provide a framework in which the wage offer distribution that
workers face in their search emerges as the equilibrium of a non-cooperative wage search
and wage posting game between workers and employers. A minimum wage policy alters the
wage offer distribution, thereby affecting the number of firms that continue to operate in
the market and increasing the average wage offer that an unemployed person can expect
to receive. A number of studies have estimated different variants of equilibrium job search
models building on the Burdett-Mortensen framework with within-market homogeneous
workers and firms and on-the-job search, to analyse minimum wage effects (notably van den
Berg and Ridder, 1998).
Within-market firm heterogeneity has been shown to improve the fit of the wage distribution
and has been modelled in different ways in the literature. Bontemps et al. (2000) allow for a
continuous distribution but estimate it non-parametrically. In the context of a minimum
wage policy, heterogeneity in firm productivity is of key importance, as in the case of
homogeneous firms a minimum wage would create a “knife-edge” impact on employment,
with all firms either leaving or staying in the relevant sub-market. In addition to incorporating
heterogeneity in firm productivity, the model by Bontemps et al. (1999) also allows for
3These numbers cannot be straightforwardly compared to differences between outcomes in say 2016 and 2014.
First, our results refer to equilibrium changes whereas the data from 2015 and 2016 reflect short-term
adjustments and the data from 2014 may reflect anticipation effects. Secondly, as discussed above, the
German labour market witnessed major concurrent shocks in 2015, notably due to the so-called refugee
crisis.
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heterogeneity in workers’ reservation wages. This creates more flexibility in terms of the
predicted employment effects. In particular, it implies that the minimum wage can have
a positive effect on employment. Because the minimum wage precludes low wage offers, it
draws more unemployed workers with high reservation wages into the market. In the absence
of a minimum wage, these workers have to wait longer for a wage offer that is acceptable to
them.
2.2. Model Description
In this section, we provide a brief description of the model by Bontemps et al. (1999),
which we will extend by allowing the job offer arrival rate to differ across employed and
unemployed individuals, as in Shephard (2017) and Engbom and Moser (2017). We start by
describing firms’ and individuals’ strategies. Individuals maximise their expected steady-state
discounted future income. They are characterised by heterogeneous opportunity costs of
employment denoted by b, which may include search costs and unemployment benefits.
The distribution of b is denoted by H, assumed to be continuous over its support [b, b].
Job offers arrive at constant rate λ0 > 0 (λ1 > 0) for the unemployed (employed) and are
characterised by a draw from a wage offer distribution F with support [w,w]. Layoffs arrive
at constant rate δ. Unemployed individuals searching for a job face an optimal stopping
problem, the solution to which consists in accepting any wage offer w such that w > φ.
Employed individuals, in contrast, accept any wage offers strictly greater than their present
wage contract. As in Bontemps et al. (2000), the reservation wage is implicitly defined as
φ = b+ (κ0 − κ1)
w∫
φ
F (x)
1 + ρδ + κ1F (x)
dx, (1)
where ρ denotes individuals’ discount rate, F (x) = 1 − F (x), and κi = λiδ , i = 0, 1. The
distribution of reservation wages, A, is then given by
A(φ) = H
φ− (κ0 − κ1) w∫
φ
F (x)
1 + ρδ + κ1F (x)
dx
 . (2)
Equating equilibrium flows into and out of unemployment, the fraction of unemployed
with a reservation wage no larger than φ for φ ≤ w is represented by
uAu(φ) =
1
1 + κ0
A(w). (3)
For φ > w, the fraction is given by
uAu(φ) =
1
1 + κ0
A(w) +
φ∫
w
dA(x)
(1 + κ0F (x))
. (4)
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From this, one can derive the steady-state equilibrium unemployment rate as
u = 11 + κ0
A(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1) UE who accept any job offer
+
w∫
w
dA(b)
(1 + κ0F (b))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2) UE who accept/reject offers
+ (1−A(w))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3) UE who accept no offer
(5)
Moreover, similar to Bontemps et al. (1999) one can show that in steady-state there exists
a unique relationship between the unobserved offer and the observed earnings distribution
functions. Equating the flow of layoffs and upgraded wages of those with a wage lower
than or equal to w and the flow of unemployed individuals accepting w, the distribution of
earnings G(w) is derived as
G(w) =
A(w)−
[
1 + κ0F (w)
] [
1
1+κ0A(w) +
w∫
w
1
1+κ0F (x)
dA(x)
]
[
1 + κ1F (w)
]
(1− u)
. (6)
Each firm offers only one wage and incurs a flow p of marginal revenue per worker. A firm
seeks to maximise its steady-state profit flow, pi(p, w) = (p− w) · l(w), with l(w) denoting
the size of a firm’s labour force. The number of workers, l, attracted by a firm that offers
wage w solves
l(w) = d(1− u)G(w)
dF (w) ,
and therefore
l(w) = κ1A(w)
(1 + κ1F (w))
2 +
κ0 − κ1
(1 + κ1F (w))
2
 11 + κ0A(w) +
w∫
w
1
1 + κ0F (x)
dA(x)
 . (7)
It can be shown that l(w) is an increasing function of the offered wage. Note that the last
term distinguishes l(w) from the original model by Bontemps et al. (1999), where λ0 = λ1.
The term reflects that if λ0 6= λ1, the number of employed and unemployed individuals that
are attracted by the firm at a wage w may differ from each other.
Firms are heterogeneous in their productivity p. The distribution of p across active firms
is denoted by Γ(p), and is assumed to be continuous over its support [p, p]. With w = K(p)
denoting the function that maps the support of the productivity distribution Γ into the
support of the wage offer distribution F , we have F (w) = Γ(K−1(w)). The solution to the
optimal wage setting problem of a p-type firm is represented by
K(p) = p−
 κ0(p− w)(1 + κ0)(1 + κ1)A(w) +
p∫
p
l(K(x))dx
 1l(K(p)) , (8)
which completes the steady-state solution of the model.
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3. Data
Our empirical analysis uses German register data, the IAB Sample of Integrated Employment
Biographies (SIAB). This administrative data set, which is described in more detail by vom
Berge et al. (2013), is a two per cent random sample of all individuals who have at least
one entry in their social security records between 1975 and 2010 in West Germany and
between 1992 and 2010 in East Germany, respectively. The SIAB data cover approximately
80 per cent of the German workforce, providing longitudinal information on the employment
biographies of 1,594,466 individuals. Self-employed workers, civil servants, and individuals
doing military service are not included in the SIAB.
The data provide an ideal basis for estimating a structural equilibrium search model
for several reasons. First and most importantly, the data contain daily information on
employment records subject to social security contributions, unemployment records of benefit
recipients as well as of registered job seekers. This permits us to precisely measure the
duration of different labour market states and the transitions between them, notably job-
to-job transitions as well as transitions between employment and unemployment (while
receiving or not receiving benefits). Second, due to their administrative nature the data are
less prone to measurement error than comparable information from survey data. Additional
advantages over survey data include the larger sample size and a much more limited degree
of panel attrition.
Sample selection proceeds in several steps. Before restricting the sample to a specific time
span and population, we fill in missing values using all the information available in the full
dataset (see Appendix A.1). We then disregard employment spells where individuals receive
Hartz IV benefits while working, because for this group the wage alone is not a useful metric
for work incentives.
We construct a stock sample by keeping only those employment and unemployment spells
including the set date 1 January 2007. Restricting the sample to the period 2007 to 2010 has
the advantage that it permits us to include unemployment spells for individuals receiving
means-tested welfare benefits, which were not recorded in the data prior to 2007. While this
comes at the cost of including left-censored unemployment spells, it enables us to adopt
a consistent definition of unemployment throughout the sample period.4 This leads to a
sample of 682,581 individuals.
From this sample we select only individuals who are part of the workforce. The data
do not make it possible to distinguish between involuntarily unemployed individuals not
receiving benefits and individuals who voluntarily left the labour force or who became
self-employed or civil servants. To distinguish more precisely between voluntary and invol-
untary unemployment, we follow the assumptions proposed by Lee and Wilke (2009) (see
Appendix A.2).
To focus on individuals in the workforce, we restrict the sample to individuals who are
at least 20 years old and younger than 63 years. The sample is further restricted to low-
4Details on the definition of the different labour market states are given in Appendix A.2.
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and medium-skilled individuals. We exclude highly skilled individuals because this group is
less likely to be in a labour market that is characterised by a wage-posting mechanism. We
then drop individuals who still have missing values in the relevant observables, such as daily
wages, the educational and occupational status as well as the regional affiliation. This leads
to a new sample size of 370,104 individuals.
The SIAB data do not include information on hours worked. We therefore focus on
full-time employment spells and disregard individuals who are employed part-time during
the time period under consideration.
To calculate hourly wages for full-time employment spells, we impute the number of
hours worked based on information from the German Microcensus. The imputation is done
separately by region, sex, sector, job classification, and educational degree. For details, see
Appendix A.3.
In the model, each job is characterised by a single, time-invariant wage. For individuals
who were employed on 1 January 2007, we compute this wage as the weighted average
of the wages earned over the past year in the same job, where the weights are given by
the length of time over which a particular wage was received. Likewise, the wage after an
unemployment-to-employment spell is based on the weighted average over the first year
after the transition.5 To reduce the influence of outliers, we discount observations with
implausibly low hourly wages (wages below 3 euros or below the existing sectoral minimum
wages). The resulting final sample contains information on 235,706 individuals.
The wage information in the IAB data is censored since there is an upper contribution
limit in the social security system. We do not inlude observations with censored wages.6
The model assumes that worker productivity is homogeneous. Following Bontemps et al.
(1999), we therefore estimate the model separately for different labour market segments.
We assume that both the employed and the unemployed receive job offers only within
their segment. We define the segments based on six job classifications (occupation types,
see Appendix A.6) and two regions (East Germany and West Germany including Berlin).
These two dimensions allow us to define fairly well (though not perfectly) segmented labour
markets. As Table 2 shows, 95.9% of employment-to-employment transitions remain in the
same region, 83.4% remain in the same job classification, and 80.1% remain in the same
region and job classification, i.e. the same labour market according to our definition. As
for unemployment-to-employment transitions, 95.3% occur within the same region, 73.7%
within the same job classification, and 70.7% within both the same region and the same job
classification (see Table 3).
5For details, see Appendix A.4.
6For details, see Appendix A.5. In a robustness check, we address this issue by replacing censored observations
with imputed wages, following Gartner (2005).
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4. Descriptives
4.1. Transitions
Tables 4 and 5 in Appendix A.7 report the type, number, and share of transitions for our
stock sample of individuals who were either unemployed (7.6%) or employed (92.4%) on
1 January 2007. Of the 217,733 individuals who were employed on this date, 68% stayed
in their job for the next four years while 20% moved to another job and 13% became
unemployed. Transitions in the other direction are much more frequent in relative terms:
45% of the 17,973 unemployment spells ended with a transition into regular employment
during the four-year period after 1 January 2007. At the same time, 55% of individuals who
were unemployed on this date remained without a job over the entire period. Left-censoring
is relatively frequent for the unemployment spells (22%) because in some of the data sources
for unemployment benefit histories, recording starts at a fixed date which does not necessarily
coincide with the beginning of the unemployment spell (see Appendix A.2).
The table also breaks down these statistics by labour market, as defined by region and
job classification. About 84% of the individuals in the sample worked or searched for a job
in West Germany (including Berlin), the remaining 16% in East Germany. On 1 January
2007, the unemployment rate was higher in East Germany (11%) than in West Germany
(7%). However, the fraction of unemployed individuals finding a new job over the four-year
observation window was almost identical in East and West Germany (44%). Looking at
transitions of employed individuals, we find that most individuals stayed at their current
employer, while around 20% of the employed individuals in West Germany and 19% in East
Germany changed their employer within the four years. The relative frequency of transitions
into unemployment was higher in East Germany (17%) than in West Germany (12%).
As for the six job classifications, note the large number of observations for “production,
craft” occupations which are still fairly important in Germany and especially in our sample
of low- and medium-skilled individuals. The unemployment rate on 1 January 2007 varied
between 5% in white-collar jobs and 20% in agriculture, partially reflecting the varying
importance of seasonal unemployment. Consistent with this seasonal influence, the share of
unemployment-to-employment transitions was particularly high in agriculture (65%). At
the other end of the spectrum, only 31% of the unemployed individuals in sales found work
within the next four years.
In our administrative data set, the number of observations is large even when interacting
job classifications with regions; sample sizes range from 1,225 (agriculture, East Germany) to
76,723 (production/craft, West Germany). Both the unemployment rates and the transitions
reflect the differences already discussed; i.e., unemployment rates are lower in the West
for all job classifications, and the differences across classifications also hold within the two
regions.
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4.2. Durations
Figure 5 in Appendix A.7 shows non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survival
function for remaining in the initial state (employment or unemployment) for the whole
sample. The survival functions are also shown for the twelve different sub-samples defined by
region and job classification (Figures 6 to 11 in Appendix A.7). In our data, the maximum
duration of an unemployment spell is six years.7 Employment spells can in principle last
over the whole observation period: 35 years in West Germany (1975–2010) and 19 years in
East Germany (1991–2010).8
Transitions out of Unemployment The chance of transitioning into employment is
particularly high within the first year – only about 60% of the unemployed were still without
a job after twelve months (cf. panel (a) in Figure 5). By the third year, about 40% of the
unemployed had not found employment, and after the third year the survival function flattens
out. As can be seen in panel (a) of Figures 6 to 11, the pattern is very similar for East and
West Germany, but there is substantial variation across job classifications. Most notably,
jobs in agriculture (Figure 6) as well as production/craft jobs (Figure 7) are characterised by
short unemployment durations. Around 75% of the unemployment spells in agriculture were
shorter than one year (the share is even higher in West Germany and lower in East Germany).
In production/craft jobs (the largest group), more than half of the unemployment spells
were shorter than one year. At the other end of the spectrum, unemployed individuals who
formerly had sales and service jobs tend to have long unemployment durations (Figures 9
and 11).
Transitions out of Employment For individuals who were initially employed, transitions
can be either into another job (panel(b) in Figures 5 to 11) or into unemployment (panel (c)).
The durations of employment spells that end because of unemployment are in general longer
than employment spells that end in a job-to-job transition. With regard to employment-
to-employment transitions, the probability of still being employed at the current employer
is typically around 75% after fifteen years. This holds for both East and West Germany.
However, employment spells that end into unemployment tend to be longer in the West than
in the East.
Regarding job classifications, sales jobs stand out both for transitions into other jobs and for
transitions into unemployment; at each point in time, the share of the employed who have left
7“Unemployment benefit I” (ALG I), a non means-tested transfer which is part of the unemployment
insurance system, is typically paid for only one year (two years for older workers). Once ALG I runs out,
the unemployed are entitled to the much lower and means-tested “unemployment benefit II” (ALG II),
which was introduced on 1 January 2005. Before 2005, ALG I was followed by “Arbeitslosenhilfe” instead
of ALG II. This means that individuals receiving “Arbeitslosenhilfe” before 2005 were entitled to ALG
II afterwards. However, spells of receiving ALG II are only recorded in the data from 1 January 2007
onwards. This makes 1 January 2005 the earliest starting point for unemployment spells in our data.
These spells refer to those individuals who received ALG I benefits during 2005 and 2006 and who were
entitled to ALG II afterwards (starting from 2007). As our sample covers the period 2007–2010, the
maximum duration of an unemployment spell is six years.
81.29% of the employment spells are left-censored which means employment without interruption at the
same firm since 1 January 1975 in West Germany or since 1991 in East Germany.
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their initial job for one of these destinations is particularly high. Agriculture is inconspicuous
for employment-to-employment transitions, but features a high share of transitions into short
durations of unemployment especially in East Germany. White-collar employees tend to
have the longest employment durations, with a large fraction of employment spells being
right-censored.
4.3. Wage Distributions
Figure 12 in Appendix A.7 shows the distribution of wages before and after a labour market
transition for the whole sample. As part of the descriptives, we include all three types of
transitions (e → e, e → u, u → e) and also document the wage distributions for right- and
left-censored spells. In the estimation, only the wages in the initial employment spell or
after a transition from unemployment to employment will be used.
As expected, wages of individuals who change their job tend to be higher than wages before
a transition into unemployment. Comparing wages before and after a job-to-job transition,
we find that wages earned in the new job are on average slightly higher than the wages
earned in the old position. Also in line with expectations, wages after an unemployment-to-
employment transition tend to be relatively low. A sizeable fraction of the unemployed move
to jobs paying less than 8.50 euros an hour, the statutory minimum wage introduced in 2015,
i.e. after our sampling period 2007–2010. This also holds within the different labour market
segments defined by region and job classification (see Figures 13 to 18 in Appendix A.7).
These figures confirm the well-known fact that wages tend to be lower in East Germany
and also document variation in hourly wages across job classifications.
In both East and West Germany, we find that on average wages are higher for white-collar
employees (Figure 15) as well as for office workers (Figure 17) while wages are lower in
agricultural professions (Figure 13), among service workers (Figure 18), and for individuals
working in sales (Figure 16).
5. Estimation
We begin this section by deriving the likelihood contributions of unemployed and employed
workers, taking into account stock sampling as well as left- and right-censoring. We then out-
line the estimation procedure, which combines the likelihood function with a non-parametric
estimate of the wage distribution.
Likelihood – Unemployed Workers As seen in Equation (5), the steady-state unem-
ployment rate has three components. For individuals with low enough opportunity costs of
employment, unemployment is purely frictional. In a second group, unemployment is driven
by both search frictions and the opportunity cost of employment; these individuals will accept
some job offers, but reject others. Finally, there is a third group for whom unemployment is
permanent given the wage offer distribution F , as any wage offer is below their reservation
wage. As a result, the likelihood contribution of an individual who is initially unemployed is
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a mixture distribution:
λ
2−db−df
0 · e−λ0(t0b+t0f) ·
A(w)
1 + κ0
· f(w0)1−df
+
dfw+(1−df )w0∫
w
(
λ0F (x)
)2−db−df · e−λ0·F (x)·(t0b+t0f) · f(w0)
F (x)
1−df
· dA(x)
1 + κ0F (x)
+ [1−A(w)]db·df . (9)
The first term of the sum corresponds to purely frictional unemployment. As job offers
arrive with Poisson rate λ0, unemployment durations are exponentially distributed. In a
flow sample, where the elapsed (“backward”) duration t0b is zero by definition, the density of
the residual (“forward”) duration t0f is given as h(t0f ) = λ0 exp(−λ0t0f ). In a stock sample,
we need to consider the total duration t0b + t0f , conditional on the elapsed duration t0b.
The latter has the density h(t0b) = λ0 exp(−λ0t0b). It can be shown (e.g., Lancaster, 1990)
that the conditional density h(t0f |t0b) is given as λ0 exp(−λ0t0f ). For the joint density we
then obtain h(t0b, t0f ) = h(t0f |t0b)h(t0b) = λ20 exp (−λ0(t0b + t0f )), which is the term that
figures in the likelihood expression above. The term in front of the exponential function is
adjusted if either the elapsed or the residual duration is censored (db = 1 or df = 1). f(w0)
is the density function of wage offers evaluated at the offer that we observe as the initially
unobserved person transits into employment. If the unemployment duration is right-censored
(d0f = 1), this term drops out of the likelihood function.
The second term of the sum has the same basic structure, but with some adjustments for
the fact that individuals in this group are sometimes faced with wage offers that are below
their reservation wage. The unemployment spell hazard rate is therefore given not by λ0,
but by the product λ0F (b). The second adjustment concerns the wage offer density, which
is now truncated at b, so we have f(w0)/F (b).9
Finally, the third term applied to individuals who, given F , are permanently unemployed.
This implies that the observed unemployment spell must be both left- and right-censored,
hence the db · df in the exponent.
Likelihood – Employed Workers For individuals who are initially employed, the likeli-
hood contribution is
κ0
1 + κ0
· g(w1) ·
[
δ + λ1F (w1)
]1−d1b · e−[δ+λ1F (w1)](t1b+t1f) [δv (λ1F (w1))1−v]1−d1f . (10)
In steady state, a fraction κ0/(1 +κ0) of all individuals is employed. g is the density of wages
in the initial job. Unlike for the unemployed, the reservation wage of a worker is observed
and equals his or her current wage, so there is no mixing distribution for the durations.
However, there are now two competing reasons for why a spell may end: layoff (at rate δ) or
9Note that as F (b) = 1 for b < w, the first term of the sum could be integrated into the second term.
We choose to present them separately here to better reflect the conceptual difference between the three
components behind the unemployment rate.
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a better job offer (at rate λ1F (w)). The indicator v equals 1 in the first case and 0 in the
second. t1b denotes the elapsed duration, and t1f the residual duration of the current job.
d1b equals 1 if the elapsed duration is left-censored, while d1f = 1 means that the residual
duration is right-censored, i.e. the individual does not change his or her job during the
observation period.
Estimation Procedure Maximum likelihood estimation of the model requires functional
form assumptions for H and Γ. The estimation is numerically cumbersome as f , g, and
F are highly non-linear functions of Γ. In particular, optimisation involves the numerical
computation of the inverse K−1, further complicated by the fact that K contains an integral
that has to be evaluated numerically as well. Beyond these numerical concerns, there is the
issue that most distributions for Γ imply wage distributions that do not fit the data well.
As an alternative, Bontemps et al. (2000) therefore propose a three-step procedure in
which the wage distribution is estimated non-parametrically:
1. In a first step, we estimate G and g (the cdf and pdf of the wage distribution) using a
kernel density estimator, and estimate w and w as the sample minimum and maximum
of the wages of workers who are employed on 1 January 2007. Based on these non-
parametric estimates and a parametric assumption for the opportunity cost distribution,
namely H ∼ N (µb, σ2b ), we obtain consistent estimates for F and f (conditional on
µb, σb, λ0, λ1, δ and the assumption that ρ = 0.004) by numerically solving the following
expressions (recall that u is a function of F ):
F̂ (w) = A(w)− uAu(w)− (1− u)Ĝ(w)
κ1 · Ĝ(w) · (1− u) + κ0 · u ·Au(w)
(11)
and
f̂(w) = (1− u) · ĝ(w) · (1 + κ1Fˆ (w))
κ0 · u ·Au(w) + κ1 · (1− u) · Ĝ(w)
. (12)
2. The estimates from Step 1 are plugged into the likelihood function, which is then
maximised with respect to µb, σb, λ0, λ1, and δ.
3. Once these parameters are known, the productivity of a firm can be inferred from the
wage that it offers:
p = K−1(w)
= w +
 κ0 ·A′(w) · (1 + κ1 · F̂ (w))
(1 + κ0 · F̂ (w)) · (κ1A(w) + (κ0 − κ1)) · u ·Au(w)
+ 2 · κ1 · f̂(w)
1 + κ1 · F̂ (w))
−1
(13)
Standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping the three-step procedure.
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6. Estimation Results
6.1. Parameter Estimates
Table 1 reports the estimated parameters and the associated bootstrap standard errors.10
The large sample size of almost a quarter of a million observations allows for fairly precise
estimates.
For the whole sample, we estimate a monthly job destruction rate δ of 0.0063. Looking
at twelve sub-samples defined by region and job classification, we find that job destruction
rates are higher in East Germany than in the West, and higher for agricultural and sales
jobs than for white-collar employees or office workers. Our estimates range from 0.0054
(white-collar, West) to 0.0118 (agriculture, East). These orders of magnitude are similar to
existing studies. For France in the 1990s, Bontemps et al. (1999) find a δ between 0.0032
and 0.0069, depending on the sector. Using SIAB data for an earlier period (1995–2000),
Nanos and Schluter (2014) estimate the monthly layoff rate to be between 0.0032 and 0.0243
in Germany. Holzner and Launov (2010), who use data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel 1984–2001, estimate a δ of 0.0047.
The estimated κ, i.e., the ratio of the job arrival over the job destruction rate, is greater
for the unemployed than for the employed. We find κ0 to be 13.72 and κ1 to be 8.18. Holzner
and Launov find a κ1 of 2.2, while their three values of κ for the unemployed (they assume
that individuals search on skill-specific labour markets) range between 5.6 and 17.1. In their
study for France, Bontemps et al. (2000) also estimate a much higher job arrival rate for
the unemployed than for the employed. In all cases, this reflects that continental European
labour markets are characterised by relatively little job-to-job mobility compared with the
United States.
The differences between regions and job classifications are potentially relevant for the
design of the new statutory minimum wage in Germany. After a transition period, the
minimum wage became uniform for all workers by 2017 at the latest. Our results suggest
that the uniform rate applies to labour market segments that differ in the extent of search
frictions and thus in firms’ monopsony power on the labour market.11
According to our estimates, the distribution of the opportunity costs of employment has a
mean µb close to 0 euros per hour, both in the whole sample and for the different sub-samples.
The standard deviation σb is estimated to be 1.85 for the whole sample.
However, unlike in the model of Bontemps et al. (1999), the reservation wages are not
identical to the opportunity costs of employment. This is because job offer arrival rates are
10While multiple equilibria cannot be ruled out (see van den Berg, 2003), we have not found evidence of this
for any of our estimated or simulated equilibria.
11Bachmann and Frings (2017) adopt a different approach to quantify labour market frictions in Germany
and estimate labour supply elasticities specific to the individual firm. Using linked Employer-Employee
Data from the IAB (LIAB), the authors document great differences in employers’ market power across
industries. Their findings indicate that retailing, hotels and restaurants and agriculture feature a larger
degree of monopsonistic power than other services and manufacturing of food products. Note that even
though their estimates are based on different sub-samples and time periods, they are well in line with our
results, pointing to larger frictions in agriculture, sales and service jobs than in production and white-collar
jobs.
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Table 1: Estimation results
N δ κ1 κ0 µφ µb σb β u
Whole sample 235706 0.0063 8.18 13.72 4.74 0.00 1.85 0.63 0.1081
(0.0000) (0.09) (0.17) (0.03) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.0004)
West Germany
Agriculture 2685 0.0087 7.50 14.48 4.69 0.00 2.34 0.46 0.1303
(0.0002) (0.58) (1.23) (0.19) (0.00) (0.20) (0.01) (0.0040)
Production, Craft 76723 0.0058 12.06 22.71 6.17 0.00 3.11 0.68 0.0856
(0.0000) (0.39) (0.83) (0.06) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.0007)
White-collar 16943 0.0054 10.77 17.84 5.91 0.00 2.97 0.74 0.0964
(0.0000) (0.56) (1.05) (0.12) (0.00) (0.10) (0.01) (0.0014)
Sales 10080 0.0079 4.79 8.47 4.15 0.00 1.52 0.50 0.1557
(0.0001) (0.22) (0.42) (0.09) (0.00) (0.07) (0.01) (0.0021)
Office 46978 0.0057 8.04 12.54 4.68 0.00 2.06 0.70 0.1101
(0.0000) (0.13) (0.24) (0.06) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.0009)
Service 45250 0.0069 7.36 12.56 4.28 0.00 1.56 0.58 0.1104
(0.0000) (0.15) (0.36) (0.09) (0.02) (0.11) (0.00) (0.0010)
East Germany
Agriculture 1225 0.0118 3.55 14.05 5.32 0.00 3.13 0.34 0.1892
(0.0005) (0.35) (1.72) (0.16) (0.00) (0.21) (0.01) (0.0076)
Production, Craft 15099 0.0090 7.16 18.74 5.73 0.00 2.67 0.45 0.1256
(0.0001) (0.53) (1.52) (0.07) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.0016)
White-collar 3081 0.0063 10.57 19.74 5.32 0.00 2.18 0.63 0.1002
(0.0001) (3.60) (7.29) (0.19) (0.00) (0.18) (0.01) (0.0033)
Sales 1932 0.0091 4.90 10.70 3.85 0.00 1.09 0.44 0.1704
(0.0002) (0.64) (1.64) (0.14) (0.08) (0.26) (0.01) (0.0148)
Office 6655 0.0061 7.89 13.67 4.47 0.00 1.42 0.66 0.1103
(0.0001) (0.70) (1.19) (0.12) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.0023)
Service 9055 0.0075 6.20 12.03 3.95 0.00 1.29 0.54 0.1263
(0.0001) (1.44) (2.45) (0.09) (0.01) (0.15) (0.01) (0.0122)
Note: Calibrated parameters: ρ = 0.004. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (100 runs).
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higher when unemployed, so it is optimal for the unemployed to reject certain wage offers in
the hope of getting a higher offer in the future (cf. Equation (1)). Based on the estimated
parameters, we find that the distribution of reservation wages is centred around a value
of about 4.74 euros per hour. The reservation wages tend to be higher and more widely
dispersed in the West, with the sole exception of agricultural jobs. Among job classifications,
sales jobs stand out for having both the smallest mean (3.85 euros in East Germany and
4.15 euros in West Germany) and the smallest standard deviation of the reservation wage.
White-collar workers and workers in production and craft have the highest reservation wages
when unemployed.
The differences in µφ between the sub-samples are almost exclusively driven not by inherent
differences in opportunity costs (recall that µb is close to zero everywhere), but by differences
in the frictional parameters. For instance, the difference between κ0 and κ1 is particularly
large for production/craft jobs in the West and particularly small for sales jobs in the East,
which is reflected in a much higher µφ in the first case. Note that differences in κ0 and κ1
also reflect differences in layoff rates. The higher the layoff rate, the smaller the expression
β ≡ ρ/δ in Equation (1), and thus the smaller the incentive for the unemployed to be picky
when accepting a wage offer – after all, accepting a job already means giving up a higher job
arrival rate. If the job has a higher probability of ending, the costs of accepting it in terms
of foregone employment opportunities become smaller.
Finally, based on Equation (5) we can compute the steady-state unemployed rate u implied
by our estimates. For the entire sample, we find a rate of 10.81%, which is higher than the
rate of 7.6% observed in our stock sample. The variation across regions and job classifications
is in line with the patterns documented for the sample, i.e. steady-state unemployment is
higher in the East and in agricultural and sales jobs.
6.2. Distribution of Wages, Opportunity Costs, Markups, Productivity
Figure 1 shows key plots for the whole sample summarising the steady-state equilibrium.
Panel (a) depicts our non-parametric estimate for G, the cdf of the wage distribution. The
pdf g, which is not shown here, is similarly estimated using a kernel density estimator.
To find the wage offer distribution F (panel (b)), the estimate for G is combined with
the maximum likelihood estimates for the frictional parameters and the opportunity cost
distribution, as outlined in Section 5 above. Note that the location and the shape of the
wage offer distributions differ from the wage distribution. For instance, more than 70% of
the wage offers but only 20% of observed wages are below 10 euros.
Panel (c) shows the estimated distribution of reservation wages. This is a normal distribu-
tion centred around µφ = 4.74 euros and truncated at 3 euros, the lowest admissible hourly
wage. Note that there is hardly any mass left beyond 10 euros. This means that the positive
effect of higher minimum wages operating through a lower rate of job offer rejections will be
mostly limited to minimum wage levels below 10 euros.
Panel (d) presents the optimal wage offer as a function of firm productivity p. For example,
a firm with a value product of 20 euros per hour will optimally set a wage of about 15 euros
16
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Figure 1: Main Equilibrium Functions (Whole Sample)
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per hour. The absolute markup, which is shown in a log-log-scale in panel (e), grows
monotonically and at a roughly constant rate with a firm’s productivity. Expressed as a
percentage of productivity (panel (f)), the relationship becomes non-monotonic, although the
pattern of a general increase is preserved; while the lowest-productivity firm has a markup
of about 15%, the markup is over 80% for the firm with the highest productivity. Put
differently, workers obtain less than 20% of the value product in these high-productivity
firms. However, as the estimate of the productivity distribution Γ in panel (g) makes clear,
such cases are fairly rare, with the bulk of firms having a value product of less than 20 euros
per hour. Finally, panel (h) shows that our three-stage estimate of firm productivity results
in a (non-parametric) distribution that is not too dissimilar from a Pareto distribution in
that the density γ is a straight line in log-log-coordinates over a wide range of p.
The main equilibrium functions for the twelve different labour markets defined by region
and job classification can be found in Appendix A.8.
6.3. Robustness Checks
Table 6 in Appendix A.8 reports results from a number of robustness checks for the whole
sample. First, instead of disregarding individuals with wages right-censored at the upper
limit for social security contributions (SSC), we use a Tobit regression to impute wages above
this limit. Second, we replace the imputation of working hours with the assumption that all
full-time employees work 40 hours per week. Third, we experimented with different ways of
assigning a single wage to employment spells that last over several years, during which time
individuals typically experience wage increases. In the theoretical model, this cannot happen
as each job is characterised by a single, time-invariant wage. In our main specification, we
use the average wage in the same job over the past year. In a robustness check, we use the
last observed wage only. The two measures differ to the extent that individuals experience
wage changes within the last year. Fourth, we truncated the wage distribution at different
levels. In our main specification, wages below 3.00 euros per hour are discounted. We
changed this threshold to 2.00 euros and 4.00 euros, respectively. Moreover, when replacing
the right-censoring at the upper limit for SSC with an imputation procedure, we tried two
variants in which we truncated the imputed wages at the 95th or 99th percentile. Finally,
we set ρ, which is assumed to be 0.004 in our main specification, to alternative values (0.002
or 0.006). We also combined the robustness checks along the different dimensions.
The estimation results are fairly unaffected by these variations. The same is true for the
comparative statics results (not shown here for the robustness checks). Only for the different
truncation levels (2 euros/4 euros instead of 3 euros) is there a slightly stronger reaction of
some of the parameters, though the comparative statics results remain qualitatively very
similar.
18
7. Unemployment Effects of Different Minimum Wage Levels
7.1. Pathways
Due to the heterogeneity in both the opportunity cost of employment and firms’ productivity,
the unemployment rate is a non-monotonic function of the minimum wage level. We will
now look into the underlying mechanisms at different minimum wage levels and for different
labour market segments.
Decomposition of the Unemployment Rate Unemployment can be of three types,
as shown by the decomposition in Equation (5). Group (1) consists of individuals whose
reservation wage is below w, i.e., who will accept any job offer. This purely frictional
unemployment decreases in κ0, the ratio of the job arrival rate of the unemployed over the
job destruction rate. For Group (2), unemployment is partly frictional (through κ0) and
partly driven by the interplay between the reservation wage and the wage offer distribution.
Unemployed individuals in this group accept some job offers but reject others, depending on
the wage offer. Finally, individuals in Group (3) are permanently unemployed because their
reservation wage is higher than the highest wage offer w.
Effects through the Wage Offer Distribution For minimum wage levels below the
lowest productivity level p, the model predicts that a minimum wage reduces unemployment,
as long as the minimum wage shifts up firms’ optimal wage offers. The reason is that in
this case unemployed individuals are now more likely to receive acceptable wage offers.
With w = 3.00 euros and our estimate for the wage offer function, this cutoff level is
pˆ = Kˆ−1(3.00) = 3.42 euros for the whole sample. The introduction of a minimum wage
of, say, 3.10 euros limits firms’ power to set wages below productivity. The lowest wage is
now 3.10 euros instead of 3.00 euros and, via Equation (8), this increase has repercussions
throughout the entire wage offer distribution. This is illustrated in Panel (a) of Figure 2 for
the whole sample: the higher the minimum wage level, the smaller the workforce l that a
firm attracts for a given wage offer w. Moreover, the relationship between l and w becomes
less steep for higher minimum wages.
As a result of these interactions operating through l(w), different minimum wage levels
lead to different optimal wage offer functions KˆMW , and therefore to different wage offer
distributions FˆMW . Increasing the minimum wage generally shifts KˆMW upwards and FˆMW
to the right (cf. panels (b) and (c)). While the biggest changes occur for low wages and
productivities, even high-productivity firms adjust their wage offer slightly in response to an
increase in the minimum wage.
These changes in the wage offer distribution affect the steady-state unemployment rate. A
minimum wage below p leads to an increase in w, which in turn means that some individuals
shift from Group (2) to Group (1) in Equation (5). As 1 + κ0 > 1 + κ0F (b) for all b ∈ ]w,w],
this leads to a reduction in the unemployment rate. For individuals staying in Group (2),
unemployment goes down as F (w) decreases for all w. Moreover, the highest wage offer w
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increases, which reduces the number of individuals who reject all job offers (Group 3).
Effects through the Job Arrival Rates For minimum wage levels above the lowest
productivity level p, the sign of the minimum wage effect on unemployment becomes
ambiguous a priori. The minimum wage now affects the lowest productivity level pMW
that guarantees non-negative profits. As a result, the fraction of operating firms Γ(pMW )
decreases. Following Bontemps et al. (1999, 2000), we assume that κ0 and κ1 are proportional
to this fraction. This means that a minimum wage above p reduces the ratio of the job
arrival rate over the job destruction rate. The unemployment effect of a minimum wage
is now the result of two countervailing forces: the reduction in unemployment as higher
wage offers lead to less frequent rejections of job offers, and the negative effect arising from
the fact that job offers now arrive at a slower rate. Formally, the second effect reduces the
denominators in Equation (5), thereby increasing the frictional component of unemployment
in Groups 1 and 2.
Effects through Reservation Wages So far, we have discussed the channels operating
through the wage offer distribution and the job offer arrival rates. Both channels are already
present in the Bontemps et al. (1999) model with homogenous λ. In our extension of the
model with λ0 6= λ1, there is an additional channel operating through A, the distribution
of reservation wages φ. This channel is present regardless of whether the minimum wage
is below or above p. As shown in Equation (1), the reservation wage φ depends on κ0, κ1,
F and w, all of which are functions of the minimum wage. While an increase in w raises
the reservation wage, a proportional reduction in κ0 and κ1 lowers it. F has a double effect
on φ, operating both through the numerator and the denominator of the second term in
Equation (1). Empirically, the resulting net influence on A turns out to be relatively small
in our application. In fact, the different density plots of A are identical to the status-quo
plot for the range of minimum wage levels considered here, and are therefore not shown. As
a result, the minimum wage effects in the richer model with λ0 6= λ1 prove to be very close
to the ones in the model with homogeneous λ.
Total Effect on Unemployment Figure 3 shows the effect of different minimum wage
levels on the unemployment rate and the average unemployment duration, based on the
estimation results for the whole sample. The solid line in the upper panel is the effect that is
actually predicted by the model. The dotted line allows for heterogeneity in b, but switches
off the channel operating through the reduction in job offer arrival rates; these are held
constant at their estimated status-quo levels. The dashed line shows the ratio 1/(1 + κˆ0).
In this case, the positive effect working through the wage offer distribution is switched off.
All unemployment is purely frictional from the start, and higher minimum wages increase
search frictions and thereby unemployment through the reduction in κ0 and κ1.
In our actual model (solid line), the relationship between u and the minimum wage
level is non-monotonic; from a status-quo level (with no minimum wage) of about 11%,
unemployment falls for very low levels of wMW and reaches its minimum at wMW = 3.45 euros.
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From there on, unemployment increases with the level of the minimum wage. The status-quo
unemployment rate is again reached at 3.51 euros; this is the highest value of the minimum
wage that does not lead to an increase in unemployment in relation to the status quo. For
higher values, the increase in unemployment is relatively modest at first but becomes more
significant above 8.00 euros. The positive effect working through higher wage offers is nearly
exhausted by this point, i.e. there is little mass left in the reservation wage density. This is
illustrated by the dotted line. The line shows what happens to the unemployment rate as
the frictional component gains more and more in importance. Since the opportunity cost
distribution H is unbounded, purely frictional unemployment (corresponding to a situation in
which all unemployed individuals are in Group (1)) is reached only asymptotically. However,
at a minimum wage level of 8.00 euros the dotted line is already very close to its limit as
wmin approaches infinity (6.96% vs. 100× 11+κ̂0 = 6.8%). For higher values of the minimum
wage, the increase in unemployment resulting from the reduction in job offer arrival rates is
therefore the (almost) exclusive driver of the changes in u. In Figure 3, this is reflected by
the near convergence of the solid line and the dotted line at about 8.00 euros.
The actual minimum wage introduced in January 2015 was 8.50 euros per hour. Adjusted
to 2010 prices, this corresponds to a level of around 8.00 euros, which according to our
model estimated for the whole sample would have increased the unemployment rate by 1.52
percentage points. In relative terms, this amounts to an increase of about 14% compared to
the old steady-state value observed on 1 January 2007.
The mean unemployment duration (panel (b) of Figure 3) is given by
∫ w
w
Au(b)
λ0F (b)
db. (14)
The three effects mentioned above in the context of the unemployment rate are again at
play here. In fact, each item in the expression depends on the minimum wage level. The
effect on the numerator Au is ambiguous a priori and, given that A changes little, probably
fairly small. The main change is likely to take place in the denominator, where λ0 decreases
in the minimum wage while F increases, again giving an ambiguous effect. The influence of
the change in the integral limits w and w is also an empirical question. Our simulations show
that the mean unemployment duration stays fairly constant at 20 weeks until a minimum
wage level of about 5.00 euros, and then grows at an increasing rate.
Heterogeneity between Labour Markets The simulation results discussed so far have
been for the whole sample, i.e. they are based on an estimation in which observations
from all twelve labour markets have been pooled (first row of Table 1). Figure 4 shows the
effect of different minimum wage levels on the unemployment rate for the twelve labour
markets defined by region and job classification. The simulated changes in unemployment for
minimum wages of 7.00 euros, 8.00 euros (around 8.50 euros in 2015 prices), and 9.00 euros
are reported in Table 7 in the Appendix. The simulations are based on separate estimations
for each labour market (cf. Table 1). We find that the same minimum wage level can have
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very different effects on unemployment depending on the labour market segment.
Focusing on West Germany first, we find that even low minimum wage levels lead to an
increase in unemployment in the agricultural and sales occupations, as well as for service
workers, while for workers in production and craft, for office workers and especially for
white-collar employees the negative effects set in at much higher levels only. A minimum wage
of 8.00 euros would have the largest impact on unemployment for agricultural and sales jobs
(an increase of around 2.6 percentage points in both labour markets) as well as for service
jobs (increase of 1.9 percentage points). Notably, the biggest labour market segment in West
Germany, production/craft, is relatively unaffected by intermediate minimum wage levels
(the unemployment rate increases by 0.2 percentage points for a 7.00 euro minimum wage or
0.5 percentage points for a 8.00 euro minimum wage). While the unemployment effect of a
9.00 euro minimum wage is still small for production/craft workers (increase of 1.3 percentage
points), it can be seen that the impact of minimum wages evolves non-linearly. Similarly, the
unemployment rate increases are small for white-collar workers in West Germany – below
one percentage point even for minimum wages up to 9.00 euros.
Importantly, there are strong differences between East and West Germany even for the
same type of jobs. For agricultural workers, white-collar employees, and production/craft
occupations, the minimum wage effects in East Germany tend to be similar to the West
at first (albeit at a considerably higher level of unemployment). At minimum wage levels
between 6.00 and 8.00 euros per hour, however, the two graphs clearly diverge. For sales
occupations, for service workers, and for office workers, the divergence begins at even lower
levels. For the big Eastern German labour market segments production/craft and white-collar
workers, a minimum wage of 7.00 euros leads to a mild increase in the unemployment rate
by around 0.6 percentage points. In particular, production and craft occupations in East
Germany see a much stronger impact on the unemployment rate for higher minimum wage
levels (+2.0 percentage points for a 8.00 euro minimum wage; +3.7 percentage points for a
9.00 euro minimum wages) than in West Germany.
Service occupations in East Germany experience similar non-linearities especially at
minimum wages around 8.00 euros. While a 7.00 euro minimum wage raises unemployment
by 2.3 percentage points (3.6 percentage points for a 8.00 euro minimum wage), a minimum
wage of 9.00 euro would increase the unemployment rate by more than 8 percentage points.
Our simulations indicate that the critical level at which the negative unemployment
effects of the minimum wage set in differ strongly by region and by job classification. If
the minimum wage were to be increased above its actual level in real terms (8.50 euros in
2015, i.e. 8.00 euros in 2010 prices), the East-West difference in the unemployment effect
would likely become much larger. The simulations for the different labour markets can be
aggregated in order to derive the overall unemployment rate as a function of the minimum
wage level (Figure 25). The aggregated rate is very similar to the rate from Figure 3, where
we simulated the effect on overall unemployment based on an estimation and a simulation
for the sample as a whole. Figure 26 shows the share of the different labour market segments
in the overall unemployment rate. A minimum wage of 8.00 euro increases the aggregate
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unemployment rate by 1.43 percentage points, very similar to our simulations using the
pooled sample (+1.52 percentage points). As discussed above, the size of the effect is mainly
driven by large labour markets in West Germany, such as production/craft, white-collar jobs
and office occupations, where a 8.00 euro minimum wage has only a small impact. Especially
East German labour markets are highly affected by a minimum wage of 8.00 euro but at the
same time account for a smaller fraction of the increase in aggregate unemployment.
To explore to what extent the different unemployment effects across labour market
segments are driven by differences in the productivity distributions and by differences in
search frictions or the opportunity cost of employment, we ran two types of counterfactual
simulations. In the first one, we combine the estimated productivity distribution for each
segment with the parameters estimated for the sample as a whole.12 As Figure 27 shows,
the unemployment rate as a function of the minimum wage level is clearly different across
labour market segments even if the estimated parameters are assumed to be identical.
In a second counterfactual experiment, we combined the productivity distribution of
the whole sample with the parameters that we estimated for the different labour market
segments (Figure 28). For office and service workers, and for agriculture (in West Germany),
the parameters are close to those for the whole sample (Table 1), and the graph for the
unemployment rate is therefore also similar to the simulation for the whole sample (Figure 3
and reproduced in each panel of Figure 28). For production/craft workers and white-collar
employees, the counterfactual graphs are below the graph for the specification for the whole
sample. These labour market segments stand out both for a high rate of job arrivals over
job destructions (and therefore relatively low frictional unemployment) and for a high mean
and variance of the reservation wage distribution (Table 1). Our second counterfactual
experiment shows that if the entire labour market were characterised by these parameters,
the unemployment rate would be lower, so the effect of the lower frictional unemployment
dominates the effect of the higher reservation wages. For agriculture in East Germany and
for sales we see the inverse picture in which the counterfactual graph for the unemployment
rate based on the parameters for these labour market segments is above the graph based on
the parameters that were actually estimated for the whole sample.
Overall, these counterfactual experiments indicate that the variation in the employment
effects across labour market segments is mainly driven by cross-segment differences in the firm
productivity distribution, rather than by differences in search frictions or the opportunity
cost of employment.
12The productivity distribution of each labour market segment is implied by the non-parametric estimation
of the wage distribution in combination with the estimated model parameters (cf. Equation 13) for each
segment. In the counterfactual combinations, we combine these segment-specific productivity distributions
with the parameters that we estimated for the whole sample. In other words, while productivity is allowed
to differ, search frictions and the opportunity cost of employment are constrained to be the same in each
labour market segment.
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7.2. Brief Comparison to Existing Reduced-form Studies
Our analysis includes the first assessment of the new German minimum wage based on a
structural model allowing for search frictions. Previous ex ante studies have relied on the
assumption of perfect competition (Ragnitz and Thum, 2008; Bauer et al., 2009; Knabe and
Scho¨b, 2009), i.e. on a model that by construction does not allow for positive employment
effects of a minimum wage. There have also been a small number of quasi-experimental
studies on the actual introduction of the minimum wage. Using the IAB Establishment Panel,
Bossler and Gerner (2016) compare firms with employees affected by the minimum wage
with a control group of firms that are not directly affected. They estimate losses of about
60,000 jobs because of the 2015 minimum wage introduction. In line with our simulations,
they find that this employment effect is mainly driven by plants in East Germany. The other
two studies use variation in the regional bite of the minimum wage. While Garloff (2016)
uses data from the Federal Employment Agency and a sample of prime age workers of age
30 to 54, Caliendo et al. (2017) use the Structure of Earnings Survey (SES) 2014 combined
with the SOEP. Both studies find either small or no negative effects of the minimum wage
on full-time employment, and a significantly negative effect on marginal employment (a
decrease of 180,000 jobs in the study by Caliendo et al.). However, these studies report
no effect heterogeneity across regions or labour markets. In our simulations, a minimum
wage equivalent in real terms to the one actually introduced in 2015 raises the aggregate
unemployment rate by 1.4 percentage points, an increase of 13% compared to the old
steady-state value. The size of this effect is mainly driven by large labour markets in West
Germany where a 8.00 euro minimum wage (which corresponds to 8.50 in 2015 prices) has
only a small impact, such as production/craft (+0.5 percentage points), white-collar jobs
(+0.6 points) and office occupations (+1.3 points). However, especially East German labour
markets are highly affected by a minimum wage of 8.00 euro (unemployment increases by
1.4 to up to 8 percentage points in some segments) but account for a smaller fraction in the
increase of aggregate unemployment. For the overall sample, this corresponds to a decrease
of around 180.000 jobs due to the minimum wage.
Comparing the predictions of the present study with the quasi-experimental evidence is
difficult for a number of reasons, some of which were already discussed in earlier sections.
First, we do not consider high-skilled individuals, i.e. the group of individuals who are least
likely to be affected by the minimum wage. Second, our analysis is based on the time period
2007–2010. Since then, the German labour market has been booming (Bundesagentur fu¨r
Arbeit, 2017). Increasing employment levels and growing real wages are expected to influence
our estimation results and minimum wage simulations in the sense that a lower bite of the
minimum wage could come along with lower unemployment effects. At the same time, the
German labour market has witnessed a major inflow of unskilled migrants, which led to high
economic activity in certain sectors but which will also affect the skill composition of the
workforce in the upcoming years. Notice also that our results refer to equilibrium changes
whereas reduced-form studies typically capture short-term adjustments and may be sensitive
to anticipation effects. Finally, our model assumes that prices and the productivity of firms
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are unaffected by the minimum wage, and we do not consider non-compliance. Based on the
extent to which firms can react to the minimum wage along these margins, the unemployment
effects of the minimum wage will be dampened.
8. Concluding Remarks
By estimating a structural model, our paper contributes to highlighting the transmission
mechanisms underlying the employment effects of a uniform minimum wage. We document
heterogeneity in search frictions and in reservation wages across labour markets differentiated
by region and/or type of occupation. Given that the minimum wage is motivated by a desire
to offset firms’ monopsony power, this suggests that a uniform minimum wage is perhaps
too blunt a tool. In future research, it will be interesting to study correlates of regional and
sectoral differences in search frictions and hence firms’ market power. For instance, they
may be related to differences in workers’ characteristics across labour market segments, to
firm characteristics, market structure and union coverage.
Our analysis faces some additional limitations which bear potential for future research.
First, our dataset does not contain information on working hours, and we have therefore
excluded part-time workers from the analysis. These workers tend to have relatively low
hourly wages on average, which means that they are potentially strongly affected by a
minimum wage.
Second, the observation window in our data set includes the “Great Recession” in the
wake of the 2008 financial crisis. However, the recession was actually mild and short-lived
in Germany compared to other countries, and our parameter estimates fall well within the
range estimated for years before the recession in Germany (Holzner and Launov, 2010; Nanos
and Schluter, 2014) and for France in the 1990s (Bontemps et al., 1999).
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A. Appendix
A.1. Data Preparation – Data Cleaning and Imputation
Imputation of Missing Information To maximise the available information, we fill in
missing values using the full dataset, i.e. prior to imposing our sample selection criteria.
When imputing missing information for the variable nationality, we first use information from
parallel spells for the same individual, then information from previous spells and, if there are
still missing values, with information from later spells. In a similar manner, we fill in missing
information on region, sector, job title, position and employment status with information of
previous and following spells but only if individuals stay at the same workplace.
Educational Status Missing and inconsistent data on education are corrected according
to the imputation procedure IP1 described in Fitzenberger et al. (2006). This procedure
relies, roughly speaking, on the assumption that individuals cannot lose their educational
degrees. Information on educational status will be aggregated in three values:
• Low-skilled: High school diploma or no qualifications.
• Medium-skilled: Completed vocational training.
• High-skilled: Technical college degree or university degree.
The final sample used in the analysis consists only of low- and medium-skilled individuals.
A.2. Definition of Labour Market States
Employment Employment spells include continuous periods of employment (allowing
gaps of up to four weeks) subject to social security contributions and (after 1998) marginal
employment. For parallel spells of employment and unemployment (e.g. for those individuals
who in addition to their earnings receive supplementary benefits), we treat employment as the
dominant labour market state. Employment spells during which individuals receive welfare
benefits on top of their wage (Aufstocker) are disregarded. It is possible that individuals
have multiple employment spells at the same time. In this case, only the predominant
employment spell is kept. The predominant spell is determined as follows: full-time spells
outrank part-time spells. When choosing between two full-time or two part-time spells, the
spell with the longest duration is kept. To break any remaining ties, the spell with the
highest wage wins.
Unemployment Unemployment spells include periods of registered job searching as well
as periods of receiving benefits. Prior to 2005, the latter include benefits such as unemploy-
ment insurance and means-tested unemployment assistance benefits. Those (employable)
individuals who were not entitled to unemployment insurance or assistance benefits could
claim means-tested social assistance benefits. However, prior to 2005, spells of receiving
social assistance can only be observed in the data if the job seekers’ history records social
assistance recipients as searching for a job. After 2004, means-tested unemployment and
social assistance benefits were merged into one unified benefit, known as ‘unemployment
benefit II’ (ALG II). Unemployment spells during which individuals receive ALG II are
recorded in the data from 2007 onwards, meaning that the data only provide a consistent
definition of unemployment for the period 2007-2010. We therefore restrict our estimation
sample to this period.
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Distinction between Un- and Non-Employment Extending the procedure proposed
by Lee and Wilke (2009), involuntary unemployment is defined as comprising all continuous
periods of registered job searching and/or receipt of benefits. Gaps between such unemploy-
ment periods or gaps between receiving benefits or job searching and a new employment spell
may not exceed four weeks, otherwise these periods are considered as non-employment spells
(involving voluntary unemployment or leaving the social security labour force). Similarly,
gaps between periods of employment and receiving benefits or job searching are treated as
involuntary unemployment as long as the gap does not exceed six weeks, otherwise the gap
is treated as non-employment.
A.3. Data Preparation – Weekly Hours of Work
While we observe whether an individual works full-time or part-time (defined as working less
than 30 hours per week), the data lack explicit information on the number of hours worked.
We only look at full-time employees and assign hours of work in the following way:
Main Specification: Imputation We complement the administrative data using the
German Microcensus. To calculate hourly wages for full-time employment spells, we impute
hours of work based on information from the German Microcensus. The imputation is done
separately by region, sex, sector, job classification, and educational degree.
Alternative Specification: 40 Hours for Everyone In a variant, we assume 40 hours
of work per week for all individuals in full-time employment.
A.4. Data preparation – Assignment of Wages
In our data, continuous employment spells may consist of a sequence of different spells
with time-varying information of daily wages. To address this issue, we adopt two different
variants to assign wages to one continuous employment spell. We also assign part- and
full-time status consistent with these rules.
Main Specification: Average over one year We assign the duration-weighted average
wage confined to the last observed year for employment spell before and without a transition.
For subsequent employment spells, the wage information used is an average daily wage in
the first year after the transition. An individual is considered mainly full-time employed, if
the weighted average duration of full-time spells over one year exceeds 50%.
Alternative Specification: Last and first observations For employment spells before
a transition and employment spells without a transition, the last observed wage is assigned.
For subsequent employment spells, the first observed wage is assigned. The last part-/full-
time status is assigned to the previous employment spell, whereas the first part-/full-time
status is assigned to any subsequent employment spell.
A.5. Data Preparation – SSC threshold
Gross daily wages are right-censored at the upper limit for social security contributions.
Main Specification: Exclusion of Censored Observations We do not include obser-
vations with censored wages.
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Alternative specification: Imputation To analyse this problem, we construct cells
based on gender, year, region (East and West Germany), and educational degree. For each
cell, a Tobit regression is estimated with log daily wages as the dependent variable and age,
age squared, nationality, experience, experience squared, tenure in the current employment,
tenure in the current employment squared, two skill dummies, occupational, sectoral as well
as regional (Federal State) dummies and dummies for part-time and full-time employment
as explanatory variables. As described in Gartner (2005), right-censored observations are
replaced by wages randomly drawn from a truncated normal distribution whose moments are
constructed by the predicted values from the Tobit regressions and whose (lower) truncation
point is given by the contribution limit to the social security system. After this imputation
procedure, nominal wages are deflated by the Consumer Price Index of the Federal Statistical
Office Germany, normalised to 1 in 2010.
A.6. Definition of Sub-Samples
Region
• East Germany: Former GDR, excluding Berlin
• West Germany, including Berlin
The labour market region of an employed individual is given by the location of the workplace.
For the unemployed, we use the region where an individual searches for a job. Where this
information is missing, we assign the region of the previous workplace.
Job Classifications
• Agriculture (Landwirtschaftsberufe)
• Production, Craft (Produktions-/Facharbeiter, Handwerker)
• White-collar (Ho¨here Angestellte)
• Sales (Vertriebs-/Verkaufsta¨tigkeiten)
• Office (Bu¨rota¨tigkeiten)
• Service (Dienstleister)
34
Table 2: Employment-to-Employment Transitions across Labour Market, Percent
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W., Agric. 70.8 12.3 1.8 2.6 2.1 9.5 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
W., Prod. 0.3 83.9 3.6 0.9 2.6 6.3 0.0 1.9 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
W., White-c. 0.2 6.8 72.4 2.1 11.4 5.5 0.0 0.3 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.1
W., Sale 0.3 3.6 3.3 70.5 15.1 5.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.2 0.4 0.0
W., Office 0.1 1.6 4.7 3.4 85.6 2.8 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.5 0.1
W., Service 0.4 8.0 2.9 1.3 4.7 80.1 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 2.0
E., Agric. 7.2 1.8 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 67.6 10.8 1.8 0.9 0.9 7.2
E., Prod. 0.1 11.5 0.8 0.1 0.3 1.5 0.7 75.5 3.1 0.6 1.9 3.8
E., White-c. 0.0 2.7 9.8 0.2 2.2 1.3 0.2 5.8 65.4 1.5 7.5 3.5
E., Sale 0.0 0.9 0.9 15.4 3.0 0.9 0.3 4.8 2.1 58.9 7.3 5.4
E., Office 0.0 0.5 1.4 0.9 12.4 0.8 0.2 2.5 2.5 1.8 73.4 3.6
E., Service 0.1 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.9 16.0 0.5 6.7 1.6 1.3 2.5 69.1
Note: Of a total of 43,396 employment-to-employment transitions, 95.9% remain in the same region, 83.4% remain
in the same job classification, and 80.1% remain in the same region and job classification (labour market).
Table 3: Unemployment-to-Employment Transitions across Labour Market, Percent
After transition
Before transition W
.,
A
gr
ic
.
W
.,
Pr
od
.
W
.,
W
hi
te
-c
.
W
.,
Sa
le
W
.,
O
ffi
ce
W
.,
Se
rv
ic
e
E.
,A
gr
ic
.
E.
,P
ro
d.
E.
,W
hi
te
-c
.
E.
,S
al
e
E.
,O
ffi
ce
E.
,S
er
vi
ce
W., Agric. 78.1 11.4 0.7 1.3 2.0 5.2 1.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
W., Prod. 0.9 82.2 2.2 1.0 2.1 8.9 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3
W., White-c. 0.7 15.2 43.5 3.2 20.8 13.8 0.0 0.7 1.1 0.0 0.4 0.7
W., Sale 0.6 17.7 3.4 43.4 15.6 15.6 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.9 0.6 0.9
W., Office 0.6 9.5 6.0 5.0 66.8 10.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1 1.7 0.0
W., Service 1.1 19.7 2.7 1.7 6.7 65.1 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.9
E., Agric. 0.5 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 80.0 12.1 1.1 0.0 0.5 2.6
E., Prod. 0.0 7.5 0.1 0.3 0.3 1.6 2.1 76.5 1.8 0.7 1.6 7.6
E., White-c. 1.0 2.9 5.8 0.0 2.9 3.9 1.0 16.5 34.0 1.0 19.4 11.7
E., Sale 1.1 3.4 1.1 14.8 5.7 4.5 1.1 18.2 1.1 34.1 5.7 9.1
E., Office 0.0 3.6 1.8 0.6 9.6 1.8 1.2 10.8 5.4 3.6 53.9 7.8
E., Service 0.0 3.0 1.6 0.0 0.8 6.3 0.8 19.1 3.3 1.1 6.0 57.9
Note: Of a total of 8,012 unemployment-to-employment transitions, 95.3% remain in the same region, 73.7% re-
main in the same job classification, and 70.7% remain in the same region and job classification (labour market).
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A.7. Descriptives
Table 4: Number of Observations
Unemployment Spells Employment Spells
Sample Total Total u → e rc lc Total e → e e → u rc lc
Whole sample 235,706 17,973 8,012 9,961 3,962 217,733 43,396 27,357 146,980 2,807
West Germany
Agriculture 2,685 456 306 150 58 2,229 390 382 1,457 9
Production, Craft 76,723 5,575 2,932 2,643 1,054 71,148 12,852 9,329 48,967 471
White-collar 16,943 728 283 445 144 16,215 3,277 1,362 11,576 109
Sales 10,080 1,086 327 759 276 8,994 2,239 1,376 5,379 42
Office 46,978 2,234 906 1,328 376 44,744 9,907 4,164 30,673 444
Service 45,250 3,837 1,448 2,389 1,126 41,413 8,577 5,193 27,643 164
East Germany
Agriculture 1,225 311 190 121 54 914 111 237 566 76
Production, Craft 15,099 1,806 896 910 351 13,293 2,421 2,745 8,127 529
White-collar 3,081 244 103 141 54 2,837 549 330 1,958 141
Sales 1,932 273 88 185 81 1,659 331 297 1,031 29
Office 6,655 439 167 272 97 6,216 1,157 717 4,342 367
Service 9,055 984 366 618 291 8,071 1,585 1,225 5,261 426
Note: Arrows (→) indicate that spells end in transitions to another employment spell (e) or to unemployment (u). Spells
without an observed transition are right-censored (rc). Additionally, spells might be left-censored (lc).
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Table 5: Percentage of Spell Types
Unemployment Spells Employment Spells
Sample Total Total u → e rc lc Total e → e e → u rc lc
Whole sample 100.0% 7.6% 44.6% 55.4% 22.0% 92.4% 19.9% 12.6% 67.5% 1.3%
West Germany
Agriculture 100.0% 17.0% 67.1% 32.9% 12.7% 83.0% 17.5% 17.1% 65.4% 0.4%
Production, Craft 100.0% 7.3% 52.6% 47.4% 18.9% 92.7% 18.1% 13.1% 68.8% 0.7%
White-collar 100.0% 4.3% 38.9% 61.1% 19.8% 95.7% 20.2% 8.4% 71.4% 0.7%
Sales 100.0% 10.8% 30.1% 69.9% 25.4% 89.2% 24.9% 15.3% 59.8% 0.5%
Office 100.0% 4.8% 40.6% 59.4% 16.8% 95.2% 22.1% 9.3% 68.6% 1.0%
Service 100.0% 8.5% 37.7% 62.3% 29.3% 91.5% 20.7% 12.5% 66.7% 0.4%
East Germany
Agriculture 100.0% 25.4% 61.1% 38.9% 17.4% 74.6% 12.1% 25.9% 61.9% 8.3%
Production, Craft 100.0% 12.0% 49.6% 50.4% 19.4% 88.0% 18.2% 20.6% 61.1% 4.0%
White-collar 100.0% 7.9% 42.2% 57.8% 22.1% 92.1% 19.4% 11.6% 69.0% 5.0%
Sales 100.0% 14.1% 32.2% 67.8% 29.7% 85.9% 20.0% 17.9% 62.1% 1.7%
Office 100.0% 6.6% 38.0% 62.0% 22.1% 93.4% 18.6% 11.5% 69.9% 5.9%
Service 100.0% 10.9% 37.2% 62.8% 29.6% 89.1% 19.6% 15.2% 65.2% 5.3%
Note: Arrows (→) indicate that spells end in transitions to another employment spell (e) or to unemployment (u). Spells
without an observed transition are right-censored (rc). Additionally, spells might be left-censored (lc). Columns Total Un-
employment Spells and Total Employment Spells refer to column Total as 100%. Columns u→ e , rc and lc refer to Column
Total Unemployment Spells as 100%. Columns e → e, e → u , rc and lc refer to Column Total Employment Spells as 100%.
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(a) u → e (b) e → e (c) e → u
Note: Plots show Kaplan-Meier survival estimate for durations in years. Arrows (→) indicate that spells end in
another employment spell (e) or unemployment (u).
Figure 5: Survival Probabilities (Whole Sample)
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(a) u → e (b) e → e (c) e → u
Key: West ( ); East ( ). Note: Plots show Kaplan-Meier survival estimate for durations in years. Arrows (→)
indicate that spells end in another employment spell (e) or unemployment (u).
Figure 6: Survival Probabilities by Region – Agriculture
(a) u → e (b) e → e (c) e → u
Key: West ( ); East ( ). Note: Plots show Kaplan-Meier survival estimate for durations in years. Arrows (→)
indicate that spells end in another employment spell (e) or unemployment (u).
Figure 7: Survival Probabilities by Region – Production, Craft
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(a) u → e (b) e → e (c) e → u
Key: West ( ); East ( ). Note: Plots show Kaplan-Meier survival estimate for durations in years. Arrows (→)
indicate that spells end in another employment spell (e) or unemployment (u).
Figure 8: Survival Probabilities by Region – White-collar
(a) u → e (b) e → e (c) e → u
Key: West ( ); East ( ). Note: Plots show Kaplan-Meier survival estimate for durations in years. Arrows (→)
indicate that spells end in another employment spell (e) or unemployment (u).
Figure 9: Survival Probabilities by Region – Sales
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(a) u → e (b) e → e (c) e → u
Key: West ( ); East ( ). Note: Plots show Kaplan-Meier survival estimate for durations in years. Arrows (→)
indicate that spells end in another employment spell (e) or unemployment (u).
Figure 10: Survival Probabilities by Region – Office
(a) u → e (b) e → e (c) e → u
Key: West ( ); East ( ). Note: Plots show Kaplan-Meier survival estimate for durations in years. Arrows (→)
indicate that spells end in another employment spell (e) or unemployment (u).
Figure 11: Survival Probabilities by Region – Service
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Note: Epanechnikov kernel density estimate. Arrows (→) indicate that spells end in another employment spell (e)
or unemployment (u). Spells without an observed transition are right-censored. Additionally, spells might be left-
censored.
Figure 12: Density of Hourly Wages (Whole Sample)
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Key: West ( ); East ( ). Note: Epanechnikov kernel density estimate. Arrows (→) indicate that spells end
in another employment spell (e) or unemployment (u). Spells without an observed transition are right-censored.
Additionally, spells might be left-censored.
Figure 13: Density of Hourly Wages by Region – Agriculture
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Key: West ( ); East ( ). Note: Epanechnikov kernel density estimate. Arrows (→) indicate that spells end
in another employment spell (e) or unemployment (u). Spells without an observed transition are right-censored.
Additionally, spells might be left-censored.
Figure 14: Density of Hourly Wages by Region – Production, Craft
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Key: West ( ); East ( ). Note: Epanechnikov kernel density estimate. Arrows (→) indicate that spells end
in another employment spell (e) or unemployment (u). Spells without an observed transition are right-censored.
Additionally, spells might be left-censored.
Figure 15: Density of Hourly Wages by Region – White-collar
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Key: West ( ); East ( ). Note: Epanechnikov kernel density estimate. Arrows (→) indicate that spells end
in another employment spell (e) or unemployment (u). Spells without an observed transition are right-censored.
Additionally, spells might be left-censored.
Figure 16: Density of Hourly Wages by Region – Sales
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in another employment spell (e) or unemployment (u). Spells without an observed transition are right-censored.
Additionally, spells might be left-censored.
Figure 17: Density of Hourly Wages by Region – Office
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Figure 18: Density of Hourly Wages by Region – Service
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A.8. Estimation Results
Bootstrapping We report bootstrapped standard errors. In very rare cases we exclude
bootstrap runs with extreme outliers according to the following criteria: a) If the likelihood
does not converge: occurs in 1 of 101 bootstrap runs in Whole sample, in 1 of 101 bootstrap
runs in W. Agric., in 12 of 112 bootstrap runs in E. Agric., in 5 of 105 bootstrap runs in E.
Sale, in 1 of 101 bootstrap runs in E. Office, in 1 of 101 bootstrap runs in the robustness
check with truncation of wages at the 99th percentile, in 1 of 101 bootstrap runs in the
robustness check with ρ = 0.002, in 3 of 103 bootstrap runs in the robustness check with
ρ = 0.006. b) If the estimated job offer arrival rate λ1 is 100 times higher than the job
destruction rate δ: occurs in 1 of 101 bootstrap runs in E. Serv.
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Figure 19: Main Equilibrium Functions by Region – Agriculture
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Figure 20: Main Equilibrium Functions by Region – Production, Craft
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Figure 21: Main Equilibrium Functions by Region – White-collar
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Figure 22: Main Equilibrium Functions by Region – Sales
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Figure 23: Main Equilibrium Functions by Region – Office
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Figure 24: Main Equilibrium Functions by Region – Service
55
Ta
bl
e
6:
R
ob
us
tn
es
s
C
he
ck
s
(W
ho
le
Sa
m
pl
e)
SS
C
th
re
sh
ol
d
H
ou
rs
W
ag
e
m
ea
su
re
Tr
un
ca
tio
n
ρ
N
w
w
δ
κ
1
κ
0
µ
φ
µ
b
σ
b
β
u
C
en
so
re
d
Im
pu
te
d
Av
g.
on
e
ye
ar
3
Eu
ro
0.
00
4
23
57
06
3.
00
32
.6
3
0.
00
63
8.
18
13
.7
2
4.
74
0.
00
1.
85
0.
63
0.
10
81
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
9)
(0
.1
7)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
00
4)
C
en
so
re
d
40
Av
g.
on
e
ye
ar
3
Eu
ro
0.
00
4
23
57
56
3.
00
31
.4
6
0.
00
63
8.
20
13
.8
1
4.
78
0.
00
1.
86
0.
63
0.
10
83
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
9)
(0
.1
7)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
00
4)
Im
pu
te
d
Im
pu
te
d
Av
g.
on
e
ye
ar
3
Eu
ro
,9
5%
0.
00
4
23
52
82
3.
00
31
.3
4
0.
00
63
8.
19
13
.7
4
4.
74
0.
00
1.
85
0.
64
0.
10
80
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
9)
(0
.1
7)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
00
4)
Im
pu
te
d
Im
pu
te
d
Av
g.
on
e
ye
ar
3
Eu
ro
,9
9%
0.
00
4
24
55
77
3.
00
47
.5
5
0.
00
61
8.
44
13
.6
9
4.
71
0.
00
1.
78
0.
65
0.
10
67
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
8)
(0
.1
5)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
00
4)
C
en
so
re
d
Im
pu
te
d
La
st
an
d
fir
st
ob
s.
3
Eu
ro
0.
00
4
23
41
65
3.
00
32
.5
1
0.
00
63
8.
05
13
.4
3
4.
68
0.
00
1.
86
0.
64
0.
10
97
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.1
0)
(0
.1
8)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
00
4)
C
en
so
re
d
Im
pu
te
d
Av
g.
on
e
ye
ar
2
Eu
ro
0.
00
4
23
71
18
2.
00
32
.6
3
0.
00
63
9.
37
14
.7
7
3.
97
0.
00
2.
22
0.
64
0.
11
16
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.1
3)
(0
.2
3)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
00
4)
C
en
so
re
d
Im
pu
te
d
Av
g.
on
e
ye
ar
4
Eu
ro
0.
00
4
23
41
91
4.
00
32
.6
3
0.
00
63
7.
43
13
.1
8
5.
20
0.
00
1.
47
0.
63
0.
10
46
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
7)
(0
.1
4)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
00
4)
C
en
so
re
d
Im
pu
te
d
Av
g.
on
e
ye
ar
3
Eu
ro
0.
00
2
23
57
06
3.
00
32
.6
3
0.
00
63
8.
26
13
.1
4
4.
64
0.
00
1.
73
0.
32
0.
10
94
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
9)
(0
.1
6)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
00
4)
C
en
so
re
d
Im
pu
te
d
Av
g.
on
e
ye
ar
3
Eu
ro
0.
00
6
23
57
06
3.
00
32
.6
3
0.
00
63
8.
08
14
.2
6
4.
82
0.
00
1.
96
0.
95
0.
10
68
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
8)
(0
.1
7)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
0)
(0
.0
00
4)
N
ot
e:
Fi
rs
t
ro
w
:
pr
ef
er
re
d
da
ta
pr
ep
ar
at
io
n
as
re
po
rt
ed
in
Ta
bl
e
1.
Fo
r
al
te
rn
at
iv
e
da
ta
ha
nd
lin
gs
at
th
e
SS
C
th
re
sh
ol
d,
se
e
A
pp
en
di
x
A
.5
.
Fo
r
al
te
rn
at
iv
e
de
fin
iti
on
s
of
w
ee
kl
y
ho
ur
s,
se
e
A
pp
en
di
x
A
.3
.
Fo
r
w
ag
e
va
ri
an
ts
,s
ee
A
pp
en
di
x
A
.4
.
B
oo
ts
tr
ap
pe
d
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
(1
00
ru
ns
).
56
A.9. Minimum Wage Simulations
Table 7: Unemployment Rate u by Region and Job Classific-
ation
Level Change compared to no MW
Minimum wage No MW 7.00 euro 8.00 euro 9.00 euro
Whole Sample 0.108 0.009 0.015 0.022
West Germany
Agriculture 0.130 0.019 0.026 0.035
Production, Craft 0.086 0.002 0.005 0.013
White-collar 0.096 0.004 0.006 0.009
Sales 0.156 0.020 0.027 0.034
Office 0.110 0.008 0.013 0.017
Service 0.110 0.014 0.019 0.024
East Germany
Agriculture 0.189 0.024 0.049 0.088
Production, Craft 0.126 0.007 0.020 0.037
White-collar 0.100 0.006 0.014 0.026
Sales 0.170 0.048 0.078 0.127
Office 0.110 0.016 0.024 0.034
Service 0.126 0.023 0.036 0.082
Total 0.106 0.009 0.014 0.023
Note: The first row shows simulations based on the whole sample while the
row Total aggregates the minimum wage effects by labour markets.
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Key: Separate estimation for each labour market ( ); whole sample ( ).
Figure 25: Unemployment Rate u for Different Minimum Wages
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Figure 26: Composition of the Unemployment Rate u for Different Minimum Wages
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Key: West ( ); East ( ); whole sample ( ). Note: Productivity distributions are taken from the different
labour markets and combined with estimated parameters for the whole sample.
Figure 27: Unemployment Rate u for Different Productivity Distributions by Job Classifica-
tion and Region.
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Key: West ( ); East ( ); whole sample ( ). Note: Productivity distributions are taken from the whole
sample and combined with estimated parameters for the different labour markets.
Figure 28: Unemployment Rate u by Job Classification and Region given the Productivity
Distribution of the Whole Sample.
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